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8 Abstract
9 We investigate the inﬂuence of total cost of ownership (TCO) information on buyer–supplier negotiations in diﬀerent
10 power settings. Based on social exchange theory and recent literature on information processing, we expect that buyers
11 with detailed TCO information and less power than their negotiation partners may try to (re)gain control over their
12 own outcomes by sharing information. The results of our experiment indicate that the performance disadvantage of less
13 powerful buyers is less pronounced when the buyer has detailed TCO information, whereas more powerful buyers do not
14 seem to be able to proﬁt from TCO information. These somewhat counterintuitive ﬁndings are explained through detailed
15 analysis of the buyer’s negotiation behavior, which shows that less powerful buyers who have access to TCO data use prob-
16 lem solving techniques more frequently than powerful buyers, who tend to rely on distributive bargaining techniques
17 instead. We conclude that power can motivate a failure to share TCO information, resulting in less eﬀective interﬁrm nego-
18 tiation outcomes.
19  2008 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
20
21 Introduction
22 This study investigates whether buyers beneﬁt
23 from total cost of ownership (TCO) information
24 when negotiating with suppliers across diﬀerent
25 power settings. TCO can be seen as an application
26 of activity-based costing (ABC) to an interﬁrm con-
27 text (Wouters, Anderson, & Wynstra, 2005). It
28 quantiﬁes the costs of the activities involved in
29 acquiring and using purchased goods or services.
30 As interﬁrm relations have become increasingly
31 important and as purchasing professionals in many
32 companies still need to demonstrate the contribu-
33 tion they make to their ﬁrm, it is relevant for buyers
34 to identify the management accounting tools that
35 might contribute to their market success and proﬁt-
36 ability. TCO is a tool that supports purchasing deci-
37 sions by focusing on all costs related to a purchase
38 rather than simply on price (Ellram, 1995). Prior lit-
39 erature suggests that TCO information can improve
40 interﬁrm cooperation, as a buyer can use the quan-
41 tiﬁed cost and cost driver information resulting
42 from a TCO analysis to communicate to the sup-
43 plier which activities cause higher costs on his side,
44 increasing his bargaining power and in turn supply
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45 chain performance (e.g., Ellram, 1995; Roodhooft,
46 Van den Abbeele, & Peeters, 2005). However, due
47 to buyers’ reluctance to share the information
48 needed for interﬁrm cost minimization, ﬁrms may
49 fail to maximize possible gains from buyer–supplier
50 negotiations (Baiman & Rajan, 2002). Drake and
51 Haka (2008) show, for instance, that concerns about
52 inequity may lead to reluctance to share detailed
53 accounting information. In this study, we investi-
54 gate whether bargaining power may prevent buyers
55 from sharing private TCO information and whether
56 this might result in less eﬀective negotiation out-
57 comes between buyers and suppliers.
58 Power can be broadly deﬁned as the capacity to
59 exert inﬂuence on other people (Kelley & Thibaut,
60 1978). Although power may derive from a variety
61 of ‘‘power bases”, it is the mutual dependence of
62 individuals that allows power diﬀerences to exist.
63 Accordingly, in interﬁrm relations, power is evi-
64 denced as the availability of alternatives (e.g.,
65 Anderson & Dekker, 2005). Prior research indicates
66 that power diﬀerences inﬂuence information search
67 strategies and drive the processing of information
68 about other people (e.g., De Dreu & Van Kleef,
69 2004; Fiske, 1993). These studies suggest that power
70 may be pivotal in the interplay between, on the one
71 hand, the need to share information in order to
72 optimize activities across the supply chain and, on
73 the other hand, the reluctance to share private
74 information.
75 This paper reports the results of a buyer–supplier
76 negotiation experiment in which we manipulate
77 both the cost information and the power of the
78 buyer in order to assess whether access to detailed
79 TCO information beneﬁts buyers across diﬀerent
80 power settings. Based on social exchange theory
81 (e.g., Emerson, 1976; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) and
82 recent research on information processing in negoti-
83 ations (e.g., De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003), we expect
84 that less powerful buyers who have detailed TCO
85 information at their disposal may try to (re)gain
86 control over negotiation outcomes by sharing infor-
87 mation and creating integrative bargaining situa-
88 tions. Our results indicate that TCO information
89 reduces the performance disadvantage of less pow-
90 erful buyers, and further that this moderation eﬀect
91 is mediated by buyers’ bargaining behavior; that is,
92 less powerful buyers with TCO information use
93 more problem solving techniques and fewer distrib-
94 utive bargaining techniques than more powerful
95 buyers or buyers that lack TCO information. These
96 results imply that less powerful buyers can compen-
97 sate for their power disadvantage by acquiring more
98 detailed TCO information. However, the results
99 also suggest that powerful buyers seem unable to
100 use TCO information to exploit their power advan-
101 tage in order to obtain even greater individual prof-
102 its. We therefore conclude that a position of power
103 may impede the sharing of TCO information, result-
104 ing in suboptimal negotiation outcomes between
105 buyers and suppliers.
106 This paper contributes to the existing literature
107 on buyer–supplier relations and the use of account-
108 ing information in three signiﬁcant ways. First, we
109 analyze empirically whether buyers proﬁt from
110 TCO information when negotiating with suppliers.
111 The literature on TCO discusses its adoption and
112 its potential beneﬁts (e.g., Carr & Ittner, 1992; Ell-
113 ram, 1995; Wouters et al., 2005). For example, these
114 studies have argued that TCO can be used not only
115 to compare and evaluate diﬀerent suppliers, but also
116 to provide decision-makers with an objective and
117 easily understood argument to support purchasing
118 decisions. It has also been suggested that a buyer
119 can use the cost and cost driver information result-
120 ing from a TCO analysis to communicate to the
121 supplier which activities cause higher costs on his
122 side, increasing his bargaining position (e.g., Ellram,
123 1995; Roodhooft, Hiel, Van den Abbeele, & van
124 Doveren, 2003, 2005). However, there is little empir-
125 ical research on the use of TCO during actual
126 buyer–supplier negotiations. To our knowledge, this
127 study is the ﬁrst to investigate whether buyers can
128 beneﬁt from TCO when negotiating with suppliers.
129 Our second contribution is to add to a small but
130 growing body of work on the role of accounting
131 information in negotiations. The existing research
132 on accounting negotiation has mainly focused on
133 three intraﬁrm issues: collective bargaining (e.g.,
134 Craft, 1981; Waterhouse, Gibbins, & Richardson,
135 1993), transfer pricing (e.g., Kachelmeier & Towry,
136 2002; Luft & Libby, 1997), and budgeting (e.g.,
137 Fisher, Frederickson, & Peﬀer, 2000, 2006). The lit-
138 erature on interﬁrm accounting negotiations has pri-
139 marily concentrated on auditor–client interactions
140 (e.g., Bame-Aldred & Kida, 2007; Gibbins, Salterio,
141 & Webb, 2001; Ng & Tan, 2003; Windsor & Ash-
142 kanasy, 1995). Although some of these studies con-
143 sider the importance of power in negotiations (e.g.,
144 Gibbins et al., 2001; Ng & Tan, 2003; Windsor &
145 Ashkanasy, 1995), they typically do not consider
146 the role of sharing private cost information. Fur-
147 thermore, auditor–client negotiations are often
148 viewed as mainly distributive. An important reason
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149 is that audit clients seem to be inclined to negotiate
150 within a single-issue framework, which acts as a bar-
151 rier to ﬁnding integrative solutions (Gibbins, McC-
152 racken, & Salterio, 2005). Conversely, we expect
153 (and our results provide evidence) TCO to be a tool
154 that may support buyers in adopting a multiple-
155 issue framework during buyer–supplier negotia-
156 tions, which may enable buyers to create integrative
157 bargaining situations. Overall, accounting research
158 on interﬁrm negotiations beyond the speciﬁc audit-
159 ing context has been very limited. This paper
160 answers recent calls for empirical research ‘‘with a
161 greater emphasis upon business processes and the
162 use of accounting in action/negotiation” (Tomkins,
163 2001, p. 164).
164 Our third contribution lies in the application of a
165 more sophisticated causal model to test for medi-
166 ated moderation eﬀects of negotiation behavior on
167 negotiation outcomes. In an extensive review of the-
168 ory-consistent management accounting research,
169 Luft and Shields (2003) conclude that the majority
170 of management accounting studies employ additive
171 causal-model forms. Because such forms may limit
172 our understanding of management accounting by
173 representing causes and eﬀects as universal rather
174 than conditional on other mediating or moderating
175 variables, Luft and Shields (2003) recommend the
176 use of more sophisticated causal models.
1 Muller,
177 Judd, and Yzerbyt (2005) observe that mediation
178 and moderation may be combined in informative
179 ways to better understand causal eﬀects. However,
180 while well-developed and validated procedures exist
181 for examining whether treatment eﬀects on an out-
182 come are mediated and/or moderated, very few
183 studies analyze mediation and moderation simulta-
184 neously. This study uses a rigorous three-step
185 approach to causal modeling in order to test for
186 mediated moderation eﬀects (cf. Baron & Kenny,
187 1986). Our analyses indicate that TCO information
188 reduces the performance disadvantage of less pow-
189 erful buyers, and that this moderation eﬀect is med-
190 iated by buyers’ bargaining behavior. Studying this
191 mediated moderation eﬀect allows us to explain the
192 seemingly counterintuitive negotiation outcomes
193 that we ﬁnd.
194 The next section reviews the relevant literature
195 and develops our hypotheses. Section three presents
196 an outline of the experimental procedures and sec-
197 tion four reports the results. Section ﬁve provides
198 discussion and suggestions for future research.
199 Theoretical background and hypotheses
200 Our hypotheses are based upon social exchange
201 theory
2 (e.g., Emerson, 1976; Thibaut & Kelley,
202 1959). Social exchange theory describes negotiation
203 as a process characterized by information exchange,
204 joint problem solving, and persuasion. In this
205 framework, negotiation outcomes (e.g., level of
206 buyer and/or supplier satisfaction, proﬁts, whether
207 or not agreement is reached) result from the com-
208 plex interaction of three constructs: negotiator char-
209 acteristics, situational characteristics, and the
210 characteristics of the negotiation process itself
211 (Campbell, Graham, Jolibert, & Meissner, 1998 Q1 ).
212 Negotiator characteristics and situational character-
213 istics are seen as aﬀecting both process-related
214 behaviors and performance outcomes. In this study,
215 we control for negotiator characteristics and focus
216 on two situational characteristics: the availability
217 of TCO information and the relative power of the
218 buyer. Based on social exchange theory, we predict
219 that the eﬀect of these situational characteristics on
220 negotiation outcomes is mediated by the negotiation
221 process.
222 The negotiation process may be thought of as a
223 series of interactions (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978).
1 More speciﬁcally, if the proposed causal model is additive,
Luft and Shields (2003, p. 198) recommend providing both the
reasons for assuming there are no important mediation or
moderation eﬀects and the consequences of omitting these
relations if they exist. In other words, the default expectation is
that there are important mediation and moderation eﬀects that
we should account for.
2 Although economic models have become the mainstream
explanatory models in many business disciplines, it has been
argued that advice to negotiators should depend on an under-
standing of the opponent’s actual decision process, rather than on
the assumption that the other party is fully rational (Bottom,
Holloway, Miller, Mislin, & Whitford, 2006). Indeed, recent
research suggests that negotiation behavior is seldom rational
(for a review, see Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000).
For example, evidence shows that despite the existence of an
agreement zone, deviations from rationality in individual deci-
sions lead to disagreements and Pareto-ineﬃcient agreements.
The problem with economic models is that researchers are subject
to the empirical indeterminacy of economic phenomena (Emer-
son, 1976). In most real-life situations, many diﬀerent outcomes
(from full cooperation to near-disastrous conﬂict) are consistent
with ‘‘rationality”. Thus, game-theoretic models rarely provide
unique predictions of negotiation outcomes. Behavioral decision
models, such as exchange models, oﬀer a set of adjustments to
rational models (Murnigham & Bazerman, 1990).
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224 According to social exchange theory, communica-
225 tion between parties during these interactions is very
226 important, as it shapes their perceptions of each
227 other and their interpretation of subsequent actions
228 (e.g., Bottom et al., 2006).
3 Communication inﬂu-
229 ences the development of a relationship, because it
230 provides an opportunity to express interest in the
231 exchange partner, to ascertain the exchange part-
232 ner’s openness to reciprocity and to inﬂuence the
233 exchange partner’s perceptions. Generally, two
234 basic types of negotiation behavior are distin-
235 guished within the negotiation process: problem
236 solving and distributive bargaining (Walton &
237 McKersie, 1966). Problem solving primarily
238 involves discovering ways to increase the beneﬁts
239 available in the relationship (Walton & McKersie,
240 1966). In the context of purchasing, bargaining is
241 integrative to the extent that buyers actively seek
242 coordination with suppliers to develop alternative
243 purchasing arrangements that are likely to reduce
244 costs and/or increase performance. The intent is to
245 identify a solution via open and accurate informa-
246 tion exchange and to make trade-oﬀs based on pri-
247 orities and mutual respect for the other party’s
248 individual goals (Campbell et al., 1998). In contrast,
249 distributive bargaining is a process whereby each
250 party tries to maximize their private outcome (Wal-
251 ton & McKersie, 1966). Distributive bargaining is
252 characterized by the use of ﬁxed-sum or ‘‘win–lose”
253 tactics such as communicating threats, excessive
254 demands, positional commitments, and persuasive
255 arguments (Campbell et al., 1998). Prior studies
256 indicate that distributive bargaining is ‘‘natural”
257 or more salient to negotiators than problem solving
258 (e.g., Weingart, Hyder, & Prietula, 1996). Naive
259 negotiators are more familiar with distributive tac-
260 tics and therefore use these tactics as default
261 approaches. This ties in with their assumption that
262 the negotiation is a ﬁxed-sum game (Bazerman
263 et al., 2000).
264 The main eﬀects of cost information and power on
265 negotiation behavior and outcomes
266 Cost information
267 Aprerequisiteforanybuyer–supplierrelationship
268 is thatcostinformation between exchange partnersis
269 shared (e.g., Dekker, 2003, 2004; Tomkins, 2001).
270 Shared cost information can be used to analyze the
271 valuechaininordertoidentifycost-reductionoppor-
272 tunities across the companies’ boundaries. Value
273 chain analysis (VCA), introduced by Porter (1985)
274 and further developed by Shank (1989) and Shank
275 and Govindarajan (1992), allows one to analyze,
276 coordinate, and optimize linkages between activities
277 inthevaluechainbyfocusingontheinterdependence
278 between these activities (Dekker, 2003).
279 Traditionally, purchasing was simply a matter of
280 negotiating the best price. Accordingly, under tradi-
281 tional management accounting, purchasing deci-
282 sions tend to track only the purchase price
283 associated with a particular supplier, burying all
284 the other costs the supplier may introduce in the
285 value chain of the purchasing organization (Carr
286 & Ittner, 1992; Degraeve & Roodhooft, 1999). Tra-
287 ditional accounting systems are therefore unable to
288 adequately support a VCA (Porter, 1985). In con-
289 trast, total cost of ownership (TCO) systems, which
290 attempt to quantify all the costs associated with the
291 purchase of a given product or service, presume the
292 existence of boundary-spanning activities (Wouters
293 et al., 2005) and hence start from a value chain per-
294 spective (Shank & Govindarajan, 1992). The cost
295 and cost driver information resulting from TCO
296 analysis can be used to optimize the performance
297 of activities across the supply chain (Porter, 1985).
298 For instance, suppliers can be made aware of the
299 extra costs they generate and also of ways to
300 improve their competitive position by reducing
301 these costs on the buyer’s side (e.g., Ellram, 1995;
302 Roodhooft et al., 2003, 2005). TCO information
303 therefore helps buyer–supplier partners detect
304 trade-oﬀs along the value chain and improve proﬁt-
305 ability by modifying the way in which they do busi-
306 ness with each other (Wouters et al., 2005).
307 Accordingly, we expect that:
308 H1a: Buyers with TCO information achieve higher
309 individual proﬁts than buyers with tradi-
310 tional cost information.
311
312 In order to reach integrative agreements that
313 lower the total costs over the value chain, buyers
3 Verbal communication between buyers and suppliers, a very
basic feature of interﬁrm negotiations, has not been systemati-
cally examined in accounting research. One reason may be that,
according to economic models, such communications are irrel-
evant. The rationale is as follows: verbal claims made by either
party are not veriﬁable and thus not strategically credible, so they
will be ignored and should not inﬂuence the actions taken by
rational self-interested counterparts (Bottom et al., 2006). This
paper reports a detailed analysis of verbal communication of
accounting information during buyer–supplier negotiations. The
results provide clear evidence of the importance of this type of
communication.
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314 need to have a good understanding of their own pri-
315 orities, communicate these to the supplier, and inte-
316 grate information about suppliers’ preferences into
317 their own understanding of the problem at hand
318 so that they can make trade-oﬀs between important
319 and unimportant issues (De Dreu, Beersma, Stroeb-
320 e, & Euwema, 2006). Prior research suggests that the
321 availability of quantiﬁed information increases the
322 likelihood that buyers engage in such problem solv-
323 ing eﬀorts. For example, evidence has been provided
324 that ﬁnancial quantiﬁcations carry more weight in
325 decisions than non-ﬁnancial information (Ittner,
326 Larcker, & Meyer, 2003), that quantiﬁed informa-
327 tion enhances persuasion, especially if it is regarded
328 as objective (Kadous, Koonce, & Towry, 2005), and
329 that relatively abstract costs are less salient than
330 outright losses (Northcraft & Neale, 1986). Since
331 TCO systems attempt to quantify all relevant costs
332 (as opposed to traditional cost systems, which focus
333 on price and do not quantify other costs), and since
334 quantiﬁed costs carry more weight in decisions,
335 TCO systems provide better insights into the rela-
336 tive importance of diﬀerent costs. Hence, they pro-
337 vide relevant information that enlarges the set of
338 possible outcomes in a negotiation, which in turn
339 leads to better problem solving (e.g., Kersten,
340 2001). As buyers have greater insight into their
341 own constraints and objectives, and as the quanti-
342 ﬁed costs within TCO information are more persua-
343 sive than traditional accounting information, buyers
344 are better-placed to cooperate with suppliers on
345 identifying and assessing alternative courses of
346 action. Thus, the availability of TCO information
347 should encourage buyers to engage in problem solv-
348 ing eﬀorts. Accordingly, we expect that:
349 H1b: Buyers with TCO information use more
350 problem solving techniques than buyers with
351 traditional cost information.
352
353 Power
354 Among the variables identiﬁed as factors inﬂu-
355 encing negotiation processes and outcomes, power
356 is one of the most important (De Dreu & Van Kleef,
357 2004). Existing research on negotiations in account-
358 ing settings shows that various sources of power
359 may have an important impact on negotiation pro-
360 cesses and outcomes (e.g., Fisher et al., 2000; Ng &
361 Tan, 2003). In particular, the power that results
362 from the availability of alternative negotiation part-
363 ners is a key element of many negotiations: indeed,
364 if other negotiation partners are available, this
365 reduces a party’s dependence on the other side,
366 which weakens the other party’s power position
367 (Giebels, De Dreu, & Van de Vliert, 2000; Thibaut
368 & Kelley, 1959). Further, empirical research shows
369 that negotiators with a viable alternative achieve
370 higher personal outcomes than negotiators without
371 alternative options or with less attractive ones:
372 negotiators with less power tend to demand less,
373 make more concessions, and achieve less successful
374 outcomes than those with more power (Pinkley,
375 Neale, & Bennett, 1994).
4 We therefore expect that:
376 H2a: More powerful buyers achieve higher individ-
377 ual proﬁts than less powerful buyers.
378
379 Turning again to negotiation behavior, a buyer’s
380 relative power is expected to aﬀect his bargaining
381 aggressiveness. In particular, buyers’ use of distrib-
382 utive bargaining techniques, which include implicit
383 or explicit threats (e.g., warning the supplier that
384 he is in danger of losing the contract), are likely to
385 rise with supplier competition. First, such tech-
386 niques are more credible when several suppliers
387 are interested in a contract. Second, increased sup-
388 plier competition reduces the buyer’s need to solve
389 problems with any given supplier or group of sup-
390 pliers (Perdue & Summer, 1991). Consequently, we
391 expect that:
392 H2b: More powerful buyers use fewer problem
393 solving techniques and more distributive bar-
394 gaining techniques than less powerful buyers.
395
396
397 The mediated moderation eﬀect of cost information
398 on the relation between power and individual proﬁt
399 Prior research indicates that power not only inﬂu-
400 ences strategic decisions such as the use of distribu-
401 tive bargaining techniques during negotiation, but
402 also drives the processing of information (e.g., De
403 Dreu & Carnevale, 2003). For instance, compared
404 to individuals with a power advantage, those at a
405 power disadvantage are more motivated to under-
406 stand the other’s needs, desires, and possible actions
407 (Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999) and seek more
408 situational control by making a positive impression
409 (Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000). Further,
410 negotiators with less power ask diagnostic rather
4 For a more extensive review of the eﬀects of power, see Van
Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, and Manstead, 2006.
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411 than leading questions and belief-congruent rather
412 than incongruent questions when facing a competi-
413 tive partner rather than a cooperative one (De Dreu
414 & Van Kleef, 2004). These ﬁndings suggest that,
415 compared to more powerful individuals, less power-
416 ful individuals have a higher epistemic motivation,
417 i.e., a greater tendency to engage in information
418 acquisition and processing, and thus a greater desire
419 to develop and maintain a rich and accurate under-
420 standing of the opponent’s intentions and behavior
421 (Van Kleef et al., 2006). Because of their high episte-
422 mic motivation, dependent buyers may try to
423 (re)gain control over their own outcomes by paying
424 close attention to suppliers in order to accurately
425 predict their intentions and behaviors (De Dreu &
426 Van Kleef, 2004). In contrast, powerful individuals
427 are less likely to seek detailed information as they
428 have more resources available and/or are less depen-
429 dent on others, enabling them to act as they want
430 without serious consequences (Fiske, 1993; Keltner,
431 Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Van Kleef et al.,
432 2006). Because of their lower levels of epistemic
433 motivation, powerful buyers are more likely to solve
434 problems and to form an impression of their oppo-
435 nent through a quick, eﬀortless, and heuristic pro-
436 cessing of information that rests on well-learned
437 prior associations (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004).
438 As distributive bargaining behavior is more salient
439 to negotiators than problem solving behavior (e.g.,
440 Weingart et al., 1996), we expect powerful buyers
441 to rely on distributive bargaining rather than on
442 problem solving techniques.
443 With regard to the implication of power across
444 TCO versus traditional information, it was already
445 pointed out that buyers with traditional informa-
446 tion, irrespective of whether they have power or
447 not, are encouraged to focus on price; these buyers
448 are less likely to take into account additional costs
449 that the supplier may cause. This limited scope of
450 information leaves traditional buyers (as opposed
451 to TCO buyers) with fewer opportunities to propose
452 a mutually acceptable solution, thus decreasing the
453 likelihood of problem solving eﬀorts.
454 Accordingly, we expect that less powerful buyers
455 with TCO information may try to (re)gain control
456 over their own outcomes by sharing information
5
457 and paying close attention to their opponent’s inten-
458 tions and behavior. That is, less powerful buyers
459 with TCO information are more likely to use inte-
460 grative bargaining techniques than either more pow-
461 erful buyers with TCO information, who are more
462 likely to using distributive bargaining techniques,
463 or buyers without TCO information, who will be
464 less able to create an integrative bargaining situa-
465 tion as their traditional cost information encourages
466 them to focus solely on price. We therefore expect
467 that:
468 H3a: Cost information moderates the eﬀect of
469 power on buyers’ proﬁts, such that TCO
470 information reduces the performance disad-
471 vantage that less powerful buyers have com-
472 pared to more powerful buyers.
473 H3b: Cost information moderates the eﬀect of
474 power on buyers’ bargaining behavior, such
475 that TCO information encourages less pow-
476 erful buyers to increase the use of problem
477 solving techniques and to decrease the use
478 of distributive bargaining techniques as com-
479 pared to more powerful buyers.
480 H3c: Buyers’ use of problem solving and distribu-
481 tive bargaining techniques mediate the mod-
482 eration eﬀect of cost information on the
483 relation between power and buyers’ proﬁts.
484
485 To summarize, we expect that the overall eﬀect of
486 power on the negotiation outcome will be moder-
487 ated by cost information and that this moderation
488 eﬀect will be inﬂuenced by the eﬀect of power and
489 cost information on negotiation behavior (the medi-
490 ator). These expectations are consistent with a med-
491 iated moderation hypothesis (Muller et al., 2005), as
492 represented in Fig. 1.
493 Research method
494 Experimental design
495 To test our hypotheses, we developed a 2 (TCO
496 information versus traditional cost informa-
497 tion)  2 (equal power versus low power) experi-
498 mental design, in which buyers and suppliers
499 negotiate a lease contract for a set of machines.
500 We manipulated the cost information and power
501 of the buyer in order to assess whether access to
502 detailed TCO information beneﬁts buyers across
503 diﬀerent power settings. Cost information was
5 We do not expect that less powerful buyers will hoard their
private TCO information, as this would not be to their beneﬁt. In
order to beneﬁt from TCO information, this needs to be
exchanged so that trade-oﬀs between important and unimportant
issues can be made (Baiman & Rajan, 2002; De Dreu et al., 2006).
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504 manipulated by providing the buyer with either
505 TCO information or traditional cost information
506 for the purchasing decision. The TCO information
507 quantiﬁed all relevant costs (in this case: price, spare
508 parts, and maintenance) associated with the pur-
509 chase of a given quantity of products or services
510 from a given supplier. All costs were expressed in
511 the same currency as the price. Buyers with tradi-
512 tional information were given only an indication
513 of the costs and of the relative importance of each
514 of the issues to be negotiated (cf. Appendix A). This
515 corresponds to traditional management accounting
516 practices, which only track the purchase price and
517 ‘‘bury” other purchasing costs in overhead accounts
518 or general expenses (Carr & Ittner, 1992). In addi-
519 tion, participants were informed that price is the
520 most expensive cost, followed by maintenance and
521 then spare parts. This information on the relative
522 importance of the diﬀerent issues provided buyers,
523 who had traditional cost information at their dis-
524 posal, with an understanding of their own prefer-
525 ences and priorities, which they could then
526 communicate to the suppliers in order to reach an
527 integrative solution.
528 We manipulated power through the availability
529 of an outside option (e.g., Giebels et al., 2000; Pink-
530 ley et al., 1994). In the equal power setting, the writ-
531 ten instructions for both the buyer and the supplier
532 contained a short paragraph about the presence of
533 an alternative negotiation partner. Buyers and
534 suppliers were equally powerful, in the sense that
535 they both had an outside option worth 1000 Euro.
536 This outside option was relatively unattractive,
537 however, as higher gains could be obtained by
538 reaching an agreement. In the low power setting,
539 buyers had no outside option and were fully depen-
540 dent on reaching an agreement with their partner to
541 earn any money.
6 Suppliers always had an outside








=  the manipulated independent variable 
=  the manipulated moderation variable 
=  the moderation of cost information on the effect of power on individual profit 
=  the mediation variable (in Tables 2, 3, and 4 measured by information
exchange, distributive behavior, and problem solving approach, respectively) 





- information exchange 
- distributive behavior 
- problem solving approach 
individual profit 
Fig. 1. Regression models illustrating moderated mediation.
6 Consistent with prior research (for an overview, see Wolfe &
McGinn, 2005), the individual parties were aware of their own
alternatives but not the other party’s. If the buyer had no
alternative, the buyer was told that in the short run the only
supplier that could deliver the required machines was the supplier
they were negotiating with. This made the buyer highly depen-
dent on the supplier, but the supplier was unaware of this. This
situation allows us to fully focus on the eﬀects of the buyer’s
situation (information and power) and how this aﬀects negoti-
ation behavior and outcomes, without having to deal with the
complexity of the supplier’s perceptions of his or her power over
the buyer. This manipulation also has the additional advantage of
being a strong manipulation from the viewpoint of the buyer,
without having to deal with the ‘‘obvious” result of virtually all of
the proﬁts going to the supplier if the latter was aware of the
buyer’s complete dependence.
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544 Subjects and procedures
545 Two hundred and eight participants were
546 recruited from a graduate management accounting
547 course that was part of a Master’s program in busi-
548 ness administration at a large West-European uni-
549 versity. The course had covered traditional
550 accounting methods, activity-based costing, TCO,
551 and supplier selection problems before the experi-
552 ment took place. The experiment was run in a com-
553 puter laboratory. Each session was restricted to a
554 maximum of one hour. The opportunity to earn a
555 performance-based cash payout was the only incen-
556 tive oﬀered. Participants earned 0.5% of their com-
557 pany’s proﬁts (on average 5.74 Euro; min = 0
558 Euro; max = 15 Euro). The participants were ran-
559 domly assigned to one of the four experimental con-
560 ditions and to a buyer or a supplier role. Procedures
561 were identical for all treatments.
562 Buyers and suppliers sat in diﬀerent rooms so
563 that they were unable to identify their partner’s
564 identity; personality eﬀects and collusion were there-
565 fore precluded. Participants read the instructions
566 describing their role and the nature of the bargain-
567 ing task and could play the game at their own pace.
568 The supplier started the game by making a ﬁrst
569 oﬀer. Participants could send messages along with
570 their oﬀers and counteroﬀers if they desired to do
571 so. All messages were recorded. The game ended
572 when (i) an agreement was reached, (ii) a player
573 opted for the outside option, or (iii) after 10 rounds.
574 In the last case, participants were informed by the
575 computer program that time was running out. This
576 only happened in a few cases (4 out of 104).
577 The bargaining task
578 The bargaining task is based on a negotiation
579 game developed by Kelley (1966) and applied by
580 many other researchers (e.g., Campbell et al.,
581 1998; De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004). The game was
582 adapted to suit a TCO setting. This means that
583 the payoﬀ tables in Kelley’s game were replaced
584 by cost tables for the buyers and cost and income
585 tables for the suppliers. The tables were constructed
586 in such a manner that the minimum and maximum
587 proﬁts that could be earned were the same for buy-
588 ers and suppliers (cf. Appendix A). Buyers and sup-
589 pliers had to negotiate a lease contract for a set of
590 machines. The buyer could earn a ﬁxed income (of
591 6000 Euro) by selling end products to an end cus-
592 tomer. The instructions explained that maintenance
593 and spare parts were needed to run the machines
594 and to produce the end product. Consequently,
595 the game involved the simultaneous negotiation of
596 price, maintenance, and spare parts. For each of
597 these issues, nine diﬀerent contract terms were
598 possible.
599 Price was an income for the supplier and a cost
600 for the buyer. Accordingly, the price issue was dis-
601 tributive in nature. This issue was worth the same
602 for each negotiator, with preferences on the issue
603 going in opposite directions. Consequently, one
604 party’s gain was equal to the other party’s loss.
605 The task, however, provided an opportunity for
606 the parties to integrate their personal interests.
607 The buyer had a comparative advantage in taking
608 care of the spare parts and the supplier had a com-
609 parative advantage in maintaining the machines.
610 Since the issue that was most valuable to one party
611 was automatically less valuable to the other party,
612 it was possible for participants to trade-oﬀ issues.
613 Such ‘‘logrolling”, giving up on less valuable issues
614 to maximize outcomes on the most valuable ones,
615 could yield a fully integrative solution or a Pareto-
616 optimal solution (Kersten, 2001). The Pareto-opti-
617 mal solution is the solution whereby neither dyad
618 member can improve his situation without the other
619 party being worse oﬀ; in other words, no other com-
620 bination of contracts oﬀers as much or more proﬁt
621 to both parties. The Pareto-optimal joint outcome
622 could be reached when the buyer and supplier
623 agreed on contract 5AZ. In this agreement, the dis-
624 tributive issue (price) is set at the middle and the two
625 integrative issues (maintenance and spare parts) are
626 fully traded oﬀ. In this situation, denoted with an
627 asterisk (*)i nAppendix A, the maximum level of
628 joint proﬁt was reached and was equally divided
629 between the buyer and the supplier.
7 As cost tables
630 were private, participants had to ﬁnd out the possi-
631 bility of a win–win solution through the process of
632 oﬀers and counteroﬀers and by exchanging informa-
633 tion about their interests.
634 Before the negotiations started, participants were
635 informed that they should realize that their oppo-
636 nent’s cost structure did not mirror their own cost
637 structure. Participants were reminded that, just like
7 The price contract did not inﬂuence the joint proﬁts:
maximum joint proﬁts were reached as long as participants
agreed on contract AZ. Nine (1AZ to 9IZ) diﬀerent contract
combinations led to maximum joint proﬁts. However, only
contract 5AZ divided the maximum joint proﬁt equally between
the buyer and the supplier.
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638 in real life, companies may have diﬀerent competi-
639 tive advantages and that, as a result, their company
640 might be competitively better at maintenance than
641 their opponent, while their opponent might be more
642 competitive in spare parts (or vice versa).
8 Further-
643 more, the instructions informed participants that at
644 all times during the negotiation a table would be
645 shown on their screen with an overview of their
646 opponent’s proposals and their own counter-pro-
647 posals, so that they would have an overview of all




651 As we want to assess whether buyers can beneﬁt
652 from more reﬁned TCO data in making purchasing
653 decisions, this study focuses on the buyer’s individual
654 proﬁt. This is the amount of money earned by a
655 buyer at the conclusion of the negotiations; it is
656 measured as the buyer’s individual proﬁt level asso-
657 ciated with ﬁnal agreement in the negotiation.
658 Although this is not central to the analysis, the
659 study also brieﬂy discusses the results relating to
660 the supplier’s individual proﬁt and the dyad’s joint
661 proﬁt, as these provide a deeper understanding of
662 the study’s main ﬁndings.
663 Negotiation behavior
664 Negotiation behavior is derived from two sets of
665 measures: (1) a set based on interaction analysis,
666 and (2) a set based on participants’ responses to
667 the post-game questionnaire administered immedi-
668 ately following the negotiation exercise.
669 First, verbal behavior is coded by means of inter-
670 action analysis in order to examine categories and
671 meanings embedded in structural patterns of com-
672 munication (Putman & Fairhurst, 2001). The classi-
673 ﬁcation scheme, which is included in Appendix B1,
674 is based on negotiation communication coding
675 schemes used in prior studies (e.g., Giebels et al.,
676 2000). Three judges, who were blind to conditions
677 or hypotheses, coded each negotiation indepen-
678 dently. Inter-rater agreements, expressed in Cohen’s
679 Kappa, varied between 0.75 and 0.95. After com-
680 pleting the coding, the coders compared their cod-
681 ing and resolved disagreements by jointly revisiting
682 the negotiation messages and producing a single
683 set of codes for each subject. Negotiation behavior
684 is determined by analyzing this last set of codes.
685 Messages sent by participants were coded for (i)
686 problem solving techniques, measured as informa-
687 tion exchange and as other integrative behaviors,
688 and (ii) distributive bargaining techniques, such as
689 sending threats or issuing warnings. Information
690 exchange reﬂects the extent to which a participant
691 shared information about priorities. Information
692 exchange was coded ‘‘0” for participants not reveal-
693 ing any information about their cost structure, ‘‘1”
694 for participants revealing the relative importance
695 (but not the numerical values) of each of the three
696 issues under negotiation, and ‘‘2” for participants
697 revealing both the relative importance and the
698 numerical values of each of the three issues under
699 negotiation. Integrative behavior is based on the
700 average of two measures: the number of rewards
701 oﬀered and the number of positive normative
702 appeals extended (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.70). Inte-
703 grative behavior is also assessed by counting the
704 number of explicit requests for cooperation. How-
705 ever, as the number of requests for cooperation
706 did not load with the rewards and the positive nor-
707 mative appeals on one factor, it is treated as a sep-
8 This was illustrated in the instructions by an example relating
to maintenance. Buyers with TCO information were referred to
the cost table for cells 1 and 2 in Appendix A: if they agreed on
maintenance contract ‘‘A”, their company would have a relatively
low maintenance cost (€ 250), but the supplier would have to
provide the maximum level of maintenance. It was explained that
this did not mean that the supplier’s cost for providing this level
of maintenance would be € 2250, as this was the cost to the buyer
if he were to provide the maximum level of maintenance himself;
rather, this amount was diﬀerent from what the supplier would
have to pay in order to provide the same maintenance level, since
the cost structures of both companies were diﬀerent. The
instructions also explained that the same reasoning was to be
applied to spare parts. Buyers with traditional cost information
were referred to the cost table for cells 3 and 4 in Appendix A and
were provided with the same text, except that the cost ﬁgures were
replaced by the corresponding number of maintenance sessions
(as provided in the cost table for cells 3 and 4 in Appendix A).
9 The information in this table was essentially the same in all
experimental cells. The table provided an overview of all
proposals made by both players (e.g., proposal supplier: 6EV;
counter-proposal buyer: 4DW; counter-proposal supplier: 5CA;
etc.). Thus, at all times during the negotiation, participants could
check the history of proposals and counter-proposals made.
Participants with TCO information also received the correspond-
ing proﬁt or loss ﬁgure for the diﬀerent oﬀers. This ﬁgure
provided no new or extra information, as participants with TCO
information could easily compute this ﬁgure from the informa-
tion provided in their private cost tables. This information was
solely provided for the purpose of speeding up the game. The
proﬁt/loss ﬁgure was not provided in experimental cells with
traditional information: participants in these experimental cells
could derive the corresponding number of maintenance sessions
and spare parts from their private cost tables, but not the exact
corresponding costs.
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708 arate measure. Distributive behavior is a summated
709 scale calculated by adding ﬁve types of distributive
710 bargaining techniques together and determining
711 the mean value. The ﬁve behavior types included
712 are as follows: general threats, exit threats, warn-
713 ings, commitment and punishments (Cronbach’s
714 alpha = 0.81).
715 Second, negotiation behavior is derived from
716 post-game questionnaires. Participants rated their
717 opponent’s bargaining behavior on four items that
718 measure the overall problem solving approach of
719 the buyers as assessed by the supplier (Cronbach’s
720 alpha = 0.88). The diﬀerent items are listed in
721 Appendix B2 and are based on prior studies (e.g.,
722 Campbell et al., 1998). A summated scale was




727 After completing the negotiation task, partici-
728 pants ﬁlled out a post-bargaining questionnaire on
729 a 1–5 scale, enabling us to check for motivation,
730 task understanding, and their usage of cost reports.
731 All checks on the experimental conditions (on cost
732 information relevance and power) are statistically
733 signiﬁcant and have means in the appropriate direc-
734 tion. More powerful buyers considered themselves
735 more powerful (F(1, 102) = 14.61, p < 0.01) and
736 buyers with TCO information judged the cost infor-
737 mation they received to be more relevant than buy-
738 ers with traditional cost information (F(1,
739 102) = 41.62, p < 0.01). Checks on procedures,
740 including the subject’s involvement in the task, their
741 understanding of instructions and payoﬀ tables, and
742 whether they had suﬃcient time to complete the
743 exercise, show no diﬀerences between conditions
744 (p > 0.10), as is appropriate. Means on these ques-
745 tions indicate that subjects were highly involved
746 (mean = 4.33; std = 0.69), that they assessed the
747 exercise as ‘‘fun” (mean = 4.07; std = 0.70), that
748 they understood both the instructions (mean = 4.41;
749 std = 0.77) and the payoﬀ tables (mean = 4.62;
750 std = 0.51), and that they had enough time to com-
751 plete the task (mean = 4.40; std = 0.98). Partici-
752 pants in diﬀerent experimental cells required an
753 equal amount of time to read the instructions and
754 familiarize themselves with the game before actually
755 starting the negotiation (p > 0.10). On average, par-
756 ticipants needed 559 s (9.3 min) to read the instruc-
757 tions. Participant gender produced neither main nor
758 interaction eﬀects on negotiation process or out-
759 comes and is therefore excluded from further
760 analysis.
761 The eﬀects of cost information and power on
762 negotiation outcomes
763 Table 1 presents the results.
10 A correlation
764 matrix of all variables included in the study is pro-
765 vided in Appendix C. As expected in H1a, buyers
766 with TCO information obtained signiﬁcantly higher
767 individual proﬁts than buyers with traditional cost
768 information (F(1, 100) = 52.90, p < 0.01). Consis-
769 tent with H2a, more powerful buyers generated
770 higher individual proﬁts than less powerful buyers
771 (F(1, 100) = 14.02, p < 0.01). The results also indi-
772 cate a moderation eﬀect of cost information on
773 the overall eﬀect of power on individual proﬁt
774 (F(1, 100) = 4.58, p < 0.05). The performance deﬁcit
775 of less powerful buyers actually disappeared when
776 they had TCO information: the individual proﬁt
777 made by buyers with TCO information and an out-
778 side option did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from the
779 proﬁt made by buyers who had access to the same
780 information but no outside option (buyer’s mean
781 individual proﬁt = 1148.33 versus buyer’s mean
782 individual proﬁt = 1007.69; F(1, 54) = 2.46,
783 p > 0.10). The performance deﬁcit of less powerful
784 buyers was thus less pronounced when buyers had
785 detailed TCO information, supporting H3a.
786 The eﬀects of cost information and power on
787 negotiation behavior
788 To explain negotiation outcomes, we analyze
789 participants’ negotiation behavior. First, we test
790 H1b, which predicts that buyers with TCO informa-
791 tion use problem solving techniques more frequently
792 than buyers with traditional cost information. An
793 ANOVA on information exchange reveals a main
794 eﬀect for cost information (F(1, 100) = 6.14,
10 Analyses are performed for all subjects in the study. However,
we obtain similar results when excluding the subjects that opted
for an outside option and thus did not reach agreement. Only 14
out of 208 subjects opted for this outside option, which may be
explained by the fact that the outside option was relatively
unattractive, as higher gains could be obtained by reaching an
agreement. Pairwise comparisons with Tukey tests indicate that
the number of dyads choosing for an outside option is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across the four experimental conditions
(p > 0.10).
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795 p < 0.05): buyers with TCO information disclosed
796 more information than buyers with traditional
797 information. An ANOVA on integrative behavior
798 indicates that the eﬀect for cost information (F(1,
799 100) = 2.39, p = 0.12) is not signiﬁcant at the 10%-
800 level, but closely approaches signiﬁcance. An
801 ANOVA on the number of explicit requests for
802 cooperation shows a main eﬀect for cost information
803 (F(1, 100) = 10.45, p < 0.01), indicating that buyers
804 with TCO information requested active cooperation
805 more frequently than buyers with traditional cost
806 information. Buyers’ negotiation behavior is further
807 examined by an ANOVA on the composite measure
808 problem solving approach. A signiﬁcant main eﬀect
809 for cost information is found (F(1, 100) = 242.00,
810 p < 0.01), indicating that, according to the suppliers,
811 buyers with TCO information used problem solving
812 techniques more frequently than buyers with tradi-
813 tional information. Although the eﬀect of cost infor-
814 mation on integrative behavior is somewhat weaker,
815 the eﬀects of cost information on information
816 exchange, requests for cooperation and problem solv-
817 ing approach, provide strong support for H1b. The
818 ANOVA on distributive behavior reveals an unex-
819 pected main eﬀect of cost information (F(1,
820 100) = 5.77, p < 0.05), indicating that TCO infor-
821 mation signiﬁcantly increased the use of distributive
822 bargaining techniques. Unreported Tukey tests indi-
823 cate that this eﬀect is mainly driven by buyers with
824 TCO information and an outside option, as these
825 buyers used distributive bargaining techniques more
826 frequently than buyers in the other three conditions
827 (p < 0.01). The Tukey tests also indicate that buyers
828 with TCO information but no outside option did not
829 use distributive bargaining techniques more fre-
830 quently than buyers in the two conditions with tra-
831 ditional information (p > 0.10).
832 In order to test H2b, we analyze the eﬀect of
833 power on the negotiation behavior variables. An
834 ANOVA on information exchange shows a main
Table 1
Analysis of negotiation outcomes and buyer’s behavior
TCO information Traditional cost information
Outside option No outside option Outside option No outside option
Panel A: Summary statistics for negotiation outcomes and buyer’s behavior
a
Buyer’s individual proﬁt 1148.33(184.99) 1007.69(449.59) 698.08 (479.06) 181.81 (616.74)
Supplier’s individual proﬁt 1188.33 (205.81) 1438.46 (349.66) 1421.15 (427.83) 1881.81 (680.61)
Joint proﬁt 2336.67 (324.29) 2446.15 (506.15) 2119.23 (263.85) 2063.64 (405.38)
Information exchange 0.37 (0.49) 0.73 (0.78) 0.23 (0.43) 0.32 (0.48)
Integrative behavior 0.02 (0.09) 0.27 (0.55) 0.06 (0.16) 0.05 (0.15)
Requests for cooperation 0.17 (0.46) 0.69 (0.88) 0.08 (0.27) 0.09 (0.29)
Distributive behavior 0.57 (0.73) 0.06 (0.11) 0.18 (0.30) 0.05 (0.14)
Problem solving approach 2.98 (0.71) 3.62 (0.57) 1.47 (0.40) 1.70 (0.45)
Cost information Power Cost information * power
Panel B: ANOVA for negotiation outcomes and buyer’s behavior
b
Buyer’s individual proﬁt 52.90 (***) 14.02 (***) 4.58 (**)
Supplier’s individual proﬁt 15.80 (***) 17.46 (***) 1.53
Joint proﬁt 15.78 (***) 0.13 1.20
Information exchange 6.14 (**) 4.16 (**) 1.56
Integrative behavior 2.39 4.13 (**) 5.02 (**)
Requests for cooperation 10.45 (***) 6.37 (**) 5.73 (**)
Distributive behavior 5.77 (**) 14.20 (***) 4.89 (**)
Problem solving approach 242.00 (***) 15.85 (***) 3.44 (*)
a Variable deﬁnitions in Appendix C. The table cells in Panel A contain, for each of the experimental cells, the means and standard
deviation for the variables. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
b Panel B presents the results of eight ANOVA analyses. Cost information and power are the between-subject factors. The ANOVA on
the buyer’s individual proﬁt tests for the main eﬀect of cost information (H1a), the main eﬀect of power (H2a), and the moderation eﬀect
(H3a) on buyer’s individual proﬁt. The ANOVA’s on the supplier’s individual proﬁt and on the joint proﬁt are supplementary analyses to
provide a deeper understanding of the study’s main ﬁndings. The last ﬁve ANOVA’s are tests for the main eﬀect of cost information (H1b),
the main eﬀect of power (H2b), and the moderation eﬀect (H3b) on the buyer’s use of problem solving and distributive bargaining
techniques. The buyer’s use of problem solving techniques is assessed through the buyer’s information exchange, integrative behavior, and
requests for cooperation. The buyer’s use of distributive bargaining techniques is assessed through the buyer’s distributive behavior. The last
measure, problem solving approach, provides an overall assessment of the buyer’s negotiation behavior as assessed by the supplier.
Reported are the F-statistics. (***), (**), and (*) indicate signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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835 eﬀect for power (F(1, 100) = 4.16, p < 0.05): more
836 powerful buyers disclosed less information than less
837 powerful buyers. The main eﬀects of power on inte-
838 grative behavior (F(1, 100) = 4.13, p < 0.05) and on
839 the number of explicit requests for cooperation
840 (F(1, 100) = 6.37, p < 0.05) indicate that more pow-
841 erful buyers used fewer integrative bargaining tech-
842 niques and formulated fewer requests for
843 cooperation than buyers without an outside option.
844 We also ﬁnd a strong main eﬀect of power on dis-
845 tributive behavior (F(1, 100) = 14.20, p < 0.01), indi-
846 cating that power signiﬁcantly increased the use of
847 distributive bargaining techniques. Finally, buyers’
848 overall negotiation behavior is examined by means
849 of the composite measure problem solving approach.
850 A signiﬁcant main eﬀect is found for power (F(1,
851 100) = 15.85, p < 0.01). Thus, according to the sup-
852 pliers, less powerful buyers adopted problem solving
853 strategies more frequently than buyers with an out-
854 side option. Overall, these results provide strong
855 support for H2b.
856 Finally, with respect to H3b, we examine whether
857 cost information moderates the overall eﬀect of
858 power on negotiation behavior. Although the
859 ANOVA on information exchange indicates that
860 the moderation eﬀect of cost information on power
861 is not signiﬁcant at the 10%-level, pairwise compar-
862 isons with Tukey tests indicate that buyers with
863 TCO information and no outside option exchanged
864 information more frequently than buyers with TCO
865 information and an outside option (p < 0.10). We
866 ﬁnd that cost information has a signiﬁcant modera-
867 tion eﬀect on the relationship between power and
868 integrative behavior (F(1, 100) = 5.02, p < 0.05).
869 Pairwise comparisons with Tukey tests indicate that
870 buyers with TCO information and no outside
871 option used integrative bargaining techniques more
872 frequently than buyers in the three other conditions
873 (p < 0.10). Cost information also moderates the
874 eﬀect of power on the number of explicit requests
875 for cooperation (F(1, 100) = 5.73, p < 0.05). Pairwise
876 comparisons with Tukey tests indicate that buyers
877 with TCO information and no outside option
878 requested active cooperation more frequently than
879 buyers in the three other conditions (p < 0.01).
880 Additionally, we ﬁnd a moderation eﬀect of cost
881 information on the overall eﬀect of power on distrib-
882 utive behavior (F(1, 100) = 4.89, p < 0.05). Pairwise
883 comparisons with Tukey tests reveal that buyers
884 with TCO information and an outside option used
885 signiﬁcantly more distributive bargaining tech-
886 niques than buyers in the other three experimental
887 conditions (p < 0.01). Finally, we also ﬁnd a signiﬁ-
888 cant moderation eﬀect on problem solving approach
889 (F(1, 100) = 3.44, p < 0.10). Pairwise comparisons
890 with Tukey tests indicate that, according to the sup-
891 pliers, buyers with TCO information and no outside
892 option made more extensive use of problem solving
893 techniques than buyers in the other conditions
894 (p < 0.01). Overall, these results on the moderating
895 eﬀect of cost information on the relation between
896 power and negotiation behavior, provide support
897 for H3b.
898 The mediated moderation eﬀect of cost information
899 on the relation between power and individual proﬁt
900 Based on exchange theory, we hypothesize in
901 H3c that the negotiation process has a mediation
902 eﬀect on the negotiation outcome. More speciﬁcally,
903 we expect the nature of negotiation behavior to
904 mediate the moderation eﬀect of cost information
905 on the overall eﬀect that power has on individual
906 proﬁt (cf. Fig. 1). Since the eﬀect of power on nego-
907 tiation outcomes is moderated by cost information
908 and since we expect this moderation eﬀect to be
909 mediated by negotiation behavior, we use Baron
910 and Kenny’s (1986) framework for combining mod-
911 eration and mediation. We perform the analyses for
912 the two main types of bargaining behavior: problem
913 solving behavior (operationalized as information
914 exchange) and distributive behavior.
11 In a sensitiv-
915 ity analysis, we also conduct the analysis for the
916 measure of the overall problem solving approach
917 of the buyers as assessed by the supplier.
11 Baron and Kenny (1986) procedure to test for mediation and
moderation is designed to test the eﬀects of a single moderator
and a single mediator. In the present analysis, however, we are
interested in the mediating eﬀects of problem solving as well as
distributive bargaining. Accordingly, we perform the procedures
for the diﬀerent mediating variables separately. Table 2 intro-
duces (in Step 3) information exchange and its interaction term
with cost information, whereas Table 3 introduces (again in Step
3) distributive behavior and its interaction eﬀect with power. The
mediation–moderation procedure is not performed for the
combination of distributive behavior and cost information,
because we only expect an eﬀect of TCO on problem solving
behavior and not on distributive behavior (cf. H1b). Because we
expect power to aﬀect problem solving (cf. H2b), we also
performed the mediation–moderation procedure for the combi-
nation of information exchange and power. The results are not
signiﬁcant and are therefore not reported. To test for overall
mediating eﬀects, we conduct the analyses reported in Table 5.
Although this overall test provides an interesting addition to the
three-step procedures listed in Tables 2–4, it is not suﬃcient in
itself to demonstrate mediated moderation (Muller et al., 2005).
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918 First, we consider the eﬀect of information
919 exchange. As shown in Table 2, this analysis pro-
920 ceeds in three steps. The ﬁrst step is a regression
921 analysis of power, cost information, and the moder-
922 ation eﬀect of cost information on the eﬀect of
923 power on individual proﬁt. In the second step,
924 two equations are estimated: (1) information
925 exchange is regressed on power, on cost informa-
926 tion, and on the moderation eﬀect of cost informa-
927 tion on the eﬀect of power, and (2) individual proﬁt
928 is regressed on power, on cost information, on the
929 moderation eﬀect of cost information on the eﬀect
930 of power, and on information exchange. Eventu-
931 ally, in the third step, one equation is estimated:
932 individual proﬁt is regressed on power, on cost
933 information, on the moderation eﬀect of cost infor-
934 mation on the eﬀect of power, on information
935 exchange, and on the moderation eﬀect of cost
936 information on information exchange. This last
937 equation is identical to the second Step 2 equation,
938 except that the moderation term of cost information
939 on information exchange is now added. The key
940 question is the extent to which the moderation eﬀect
941 of cost information on the relation between power
942 and individual proﬁt is reduced in moving from
943 Step 2 to Step 3. Information exchange mediates
944 the moderation eﬀect of cost information on power
945 if the following conditions are met (Baron &
946 Kenny, 1986, p. 1179): (1) the moderation eﬀect
947 of cost information on power should aﬀect individ-
948 ual proﬁt less at Step 3 than at Step 2; (2) in Step 3,
949 the moderation eﬀect of cost information on infor-
950 mation exchange should aﬀect individual proﬁt sig-
951 niﬁcantly; (3) ﬁnally, in Step 2 cost information
952 should aﬀect information exchange, which results
953 in a correlation between the moderation eﬀect of
954 cost information on the eﬀect of power (i.e.,
955 power * cost information) and the moderation
956 eﬀect of cost information on the eﬀect of informa-
957 tion exchange (i.e., cost information * information
958 exchange). As can been seen in Table 2, all these
959 conditions are met. In Step 2, cost information sig-
960 niﬁcantly explains information exchange (coeﬃ-
961 cient = 0.41, p < 0.05), and in Step 3 the
962 moderation eﬀect of cost information on informa-
963 tion exchange signiﬁcantly aﬀects individual proﬁt
964 (coeﬃcient = 651.51, p < 0.01). Furthermore, the
965 moderation eﬀect of cost information on the eﬀect
966 of power on individual proﬁt is reduced in moving
967 from Step 2 to Step 3, where it has dropped to a
968 non-signiﬁcant level (coeﬃcient in Step 1 =
969 375.62, p < 0.05 and coeﬃcient in Step 3 =
970 250.73, p > 0.10), indicating ‘‘full” mediated mod-
971 eration. These results imply that information
972 exchange mediates the moderation eﬀect of cost
973 information on power.
Table 2
Three-step regression procedure for testing mediation and moderation of information exchange
a









Constant 181.82 (*) 0.32 (***) 165.53 (*) 310.99 (***)
Cost information 825.87 (***) 0.41 (**) 804.75 (***) 517.27 (***)
Power 516.26 (***) 0.09 520.73 (***) 480.77 (***)
Power * cost information 375.62 (**) 0.28 361.45 (**) 250.73
Information exchange 51.19 405.96 (***)




2 F for R
2 0.41 (***) 0.11 (***) 0.41 (***) 0.49(***)
(***), (**), and (*) indicate signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%.
a Variable deﬁnitions in Appendix C. This table presents our results on Baron and Kenny’s (1986) three-step procedure to test whether
buyers’ use of problem solving techniques (operationalized as information exchange) mediates the moderation eﬀect of cost information on
the relation between power and buyers’ proﬁts (H3c). (See Table 3 for our test for distributive bargaining techniques.) The table above
presents the results of four regression analyses. In Step 1, the dependent variable buyer’s individual proﬁt is regressed on cost information,
on power, and on the moderation term power * cost information. In Step 2, the dependent variable information exchange is ﬁrst regressed
on cost information, on power, and on the moderation term power * cost information. Then, the dependent variable buyer’s individual
proﬁt is regressed on cost information, on power, on the moderation term power * cost information, and on information exchange. In Step
3, the dependent variable buyer’s individual proﬁt is regressed on cost information, on power, on the moderation term power * cost
information, on information exchange, and on the moderation term cost information * information exchange. Regression coeﬃcients are
reported.
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974 The same three-step procedure is undertaken for
975 distributive bargaining behavior (cf. Table 3). As
976 shown by the results, neither cost information nor
977 power has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on distributive behav-
978 ior in Step 2. However, mediated moderation is also
979 demonstrated (1) if the moderation eﬀect of cost
980 information on power has less of an eﬀect on indi-
981 vidual proﬁt in Step 3 than in Step 2, (2) if the eﬀect
982 of power on distributive behavior is moderated by
983 cost information in Step 2, and (3) if the eﬀect of
984 distributive behavior on individual proﬁt is non-
985 zero (Muller et al., 2005). As can been seen in Table
986 3, all these conditions are met. In Step 2 the moder-
987 ation eﬀect signiﬁcantly explains distributive behav-
988 ior (coeﬃcient = 0.37, p < 0.05), and in Step 3
989 distributive behavior signiﬁcantly aﬀects individual
990 proﬁt (coeﬃcient = 942.23, p < 0.10). Furthermore,
991 the moderation eﬀect of cost information on the
992 relation between power and individual proﬁt is
993 reduced in moving from Step 2 to Step 3 (though
994 it does not drop to non-signiﬁcance, providing evi-
995 dence for ‘‘partial” mediated moderation). Finally,
996 in a sensitivity analysis, the three-step procedure is
997 also applied to determine the buyer’s overall prob-
998 lem solving approach as assessed by the supplier
999 (cf. Table 4). The results are very similar to those
1000 in Table 2. Overall, we conclude that the results
1001 reported in Tables 2 and 4 provide support for
1002 our expectation that the moderation eﬀect of cost
1003 information on the relation between power and buy-
1004 ers’ proﬁts is mediated by buyers’ problem solving
1005 behavior. Table 3 provides support that the moder-
1006 ation eﬀect is partially mediated by the buyers’ dis-
1007 tributive bargaining behavior. Together, these
1008 results support H3c.
1009 In a last set of analyses, we test for the overall
1010 mediation eﬀect of the negotiation process (cf. Table
1011 5).
12,13 We conduct a hierarchical regression analy-
1012 sis, in which dummy variables representing the
1013 manipulations are entered in Step 1 and the pro-
1014 posed sets of mediators are entered in Step 2 (cf.
Table 3
Three-step regression procedure for testing mediation and moderation of distributive behavior
a
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Buyer’s individual proﬁt Distributive behavior Buyer’s individual proﬁt Buyer’s individual proﬁt
Constant 181.82 (*) 0.05 179.73 (*) 138.99
Cost information 825.87 (***) 0.02 825.13 (***) 810.72 (***)
Power 516.26 (***) 0.13 510.21 (***) 557.21 (***)
Power * cost information 375.62 (**) 0.37 (**) 392.81 (**) 364.60 (**)
Distributive behavior 46.00 942.23 (*)
Power * distributive behavior 931.62 (*)
R
2 F for R
2 0.41 (***) 0.21 (***) 0.41 (***) 0.42 (***)
(***), (**), and (*) indicate signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%.
a Variable deﬁnitions in Appendix C. This table presents our results on Baron and Kenny’s (1986) three-step procedure to test whether
buyers’ use of distributive bargaining techniques mediates the moderation eﬀect of cost information on the relation between power and
buyers’ proﬁts (H3c). (See Table 2 for our tests for problem solving techniques.) The table above presents the results of four regression
analyses. In Step 1, the dependent variable buyer’s individual proﬁt is regressed on cost information, on power, and on the moderation
term power * cost information. In Step 2, the dependent variable distributive behavior is ﬁrst regressed on cost information, on power, and
on the moderation term power * cost information. Then, the dependent variable buyer’s individual proﬁt is regressed on cost information,
on power, on the moderation term power * cost information, and on distributive behavior. In Step 3, the dependent variable buyer’s
individual proﬁt is regressed on cost information, on power, on the moderation term power * cost information, on distributive behavior,
and on the moderation term power * distributive behavior. Regression coeﬃcients are reported.
12 The process variables in Table 5 are information exchange
and distributive behavior (and their interaction with cost infor-
mation and power, respectively). Replacing the information
exchange variable by the problem solving behavior variable yields
similar results.
13 Finally, we perform several sensitivity analyses to test the
robustness of the results against diﬀerent ways of measuring
negotiation behavior. First, similar results are obtained when
information exchange is coded ‘‘0” for participants not revealing
any information about their cost structure, and ‘‘1” for partic-
ipants revealing the relative importance of each of the three issues
(with or without the numerical values). Second, we analyze
participants’ ratings of their own bargaining strategies. The self-
assessed problem solving behavior of the buyers correlates well
with suppliers’ assessment of buyers’ problem solving behavior
(Pearson correlation = 0.41, p < 0.01). However, as one of the
four items (i.e., the question whether the participant was honest
or deceptive) assessed by the buyers does not load with the other
items on one factor, the problem solving construct is based on the
supplier’s assessment of the buyer’s behavior. Similar results are
obtained and hence the conclusions remain the same when the
problem solving approach construct combines the items from
both the suppliers’ and the buyers’ questionnaires.
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1015 Weingart et al., 1996). Results for regression (1) are
1016 very similar to those obtained from the ANOVA
1017 analysis: both main eﬀects and the moderation eﬀect
1018 are signiﬁcant. The R
2 of the model is 0.41 and the
1019 F-test is highly signiﬁcant (p < 0.01). When the pro-
1020 cess variables are added to the equation, the moder-
1021 ation eﬀect of cost information on the eﬀect of
1022 power on individual proﬁt drops to a non-signiﬁ-
1023 cant level (coeﬃcient = 233.69, p > 0.10) and all
1024 process variables reach signiﬁcance. Information
Table 4
Three-step regression procedure for testing mediation and moderation of problem solving approach
a









Constant 181.82 (*) 1.71 (***) 174.60 1012.78 (***)
Cost information 825.87 (***) 1.91 (***) 817.78 (***) 666.23
Power 516.26 (***) 1.45 517.25 (***) 402.48 (***)
Power * cost information 375.62 (**) 1.85 (*) 373.89 (**) 144.73
Problem solving approach 4.24 487.50 (***)
Cost information * problem solving approach 670.37 (***)
R
2 F for R
2 0.41 (***) 0.72 (***) 0.41 (***) 0.49 (***)
(***), (**), and (*) indicate signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%.
a Variable deﬁnitions in Appendix C. This table reports a sensitivity analysis using Baron and Kenny’s (1986) three-step procedure to
test whether buyers’ overall problem solving approach (as assessed by the suppliers) mediates the moderation eﬀect of cost information on
the relation between power and buyers’ proﬁts (H3c). The table presents the results of four regression analyses. In Step 1, the dependent
variable buyer’s individual proﬁt is regressed on cost information, on power, and on the moderation term power * cost information. In
Step 2, the dependent variable problem-solving approach is ﬁrst regressed on cost information, on power, and on the moderation term
power * cost information. Then, the dependent variable buyer’s individual proﬁt is regressed on cost information, on power, on the
moderation term power * cost information, and on problem solving approach. In Step 3, the dependent variable buyer’s individual proﬁt is
regressed on cost information, on power, on the moderation term power * cost information, on problem solving approach, and on the
moderation term cost information*problem solving approach. Regression coeﬃcients are reported.
Table 5




Equations 2: situational characteristics
and negotiation process
Constant 181.82 (*) 276.58 (***)
Cost information 825.87 (***) 488.09 (***)
Power 516.26 (***) 528.19 (***)
Power * cost information 375.62 (**) 233.69
Information exchange 467.67 (***)
Cost information * information
exchange
700.11 (***)
Distributive behavior 1188.89 (**)




2 22.66 (***) 14.84 (***)
Change in R
2 0.11
F for change in R
2 5.76 (***)
(***), (**), and (*) indicate signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%.
a Variable deﬁnitions in Appendix C. This table reports our results of a test for the overall mediating eﬀects of negotiation behavior on
buyer’s individual proﬁt. Although this overall test provides an interesting addition to the three-step procedures listed in Tables 2–4,i ti s
not suﬃcient in itself to demonstrate mediated moderation (Muller et al., 2005). The table presents the results of two regression analyses.
First, the dependent variable buyer’s individual proﬁt is regressed on cost information, on power, and on the moderation term pow-
er * cost information. Second, the dependent variable buyer’s individual proﬁt is regressed on cost information, on power, on the
moderation term power * cost information, on information exchange, on the moderation term cost information * information exchange,
on distributive behavior, and on the moderation term power * distributive behavior. Regression coeﬃcients are reported.
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1025 exchange has a negative impact on individual proﬁt
1026 (coeﬃcient = 467.70, p < 0.01). However, the
1027 positive and signiﬁcant moderation eﬀect of cost
1028 information on the eﬀect of information exchange
1029 (coeﬃcient = 700.11, p < 0.01) implies that this neg-
1030 ative relation between information exchange and
1031 individual proﬁt is only true for buyers lacking
1032 TCO information. Buyers who have access to
1033 TCO information and who exchange this informa-
1034 tion earn signiﬁcantly higher individual proﬁts. Dis-
1035 tributive behavior has a positive eﬀect on individual
1036 proﬁt (coeﬃcient = 1188.89, p < 0.05), but this is
1037 not the case for buyers with power (coeﬃcient =
1038 1181.94, p < 0.05). In addition, the model’s R
2
1039 increases signiﬁcantly, from 0.41 to 0.52 (F for
1040 change in R
2 = 5.76, p < 0.01). Together, these
1041 results provide support for our expectation that
1042 the moderation eﬀect on the outcome variable is
1043 mediated by the process variables. As shown by
1044 the signiﬁcant moderation eﬀect in equation 1, the
1045 performance disadvantage of less powerful buyers
1046 is less pronounced when the buyer has detailed
1047 TCO information. We also expect this moderation
1048 eﬀect to be mediated by the process variables: med-
1049 iated moderation implies that the overall modera-
1050 tion eﬀect is reduced once the mediating process is
1051 taken into account (Muller et al., 2005). Equation
1052 2 clearly indicates that the moderation eﬀect of cost
1053 information and power becomes insigniﬁcant when
1054 the process variables are added.
1055 Supplementary analyses of the supplier’s negotiation
1056 outcome and behavior
1057 Table 1 also reports the results of the analyses of
1058 the supplier’s individual proﬁt and of the joint
1059 proﬁt. An ANOVA on the supplier’s individual proﬁt
1060 reveals main eﬀects for power and cost information.
1061 Suppliers facing less powerful buyers earned higher
1062 individual proﬁts (F(1, 100) = 17.46, p < 0.01).
1063 However, supplier proﬁts were lower when they
1064 negotiated with buyers with TCO information
1065 (F(1, 100) = 15.80, p < 0.01). Joint proﬁts were sig-
1066 niﬁcantly higher when the buyer possessed TCO
1067 information (F(1, 100) = 15.78, p < 0.01). Together,
1068 these results indicate that buyers with TCO infor-
1069 mation and no outside option obtained high indi-
1070 vidual proﬁts not because they knew ‘‘how to
1071 fool” the (more powerful) suppliers, but because
1072 these dyads realized higher joint proﬁts than dyads
1073 in which the buyer had an outside option (mean
1074 joint proﬁt = 2446.15 versus mean joint
1075 proﬁt = 2336.67). Suppliers facing buyers without
1076 an outside option earned more than their less pow-
1077 erful opponents (buyer’s mean individual proﬁt =
1078 1007.69 versus supplier’s mean individual proﬁt =
1079 1438.46), reﬂecting the power imbalance. However,
1080 less powerful buyers with TCO information were
1081 able to earn similar individual proﬁts as buyers with
1082 an outside option and TCO information, a result
1083 that we explained through the detailed analysis of
1084 the buyers’ negotiation behavior.
1085 Finally, in order to assess the eﬀects of buyers’
1086 behavior on suppliers’ behavior, we present results
1087 (not tabulated) on the suppliers’ bargaining behav-
1088 ior. Recall that the experimental manipulation for
1089 the suppliers was the same in each of the experimen-
1090 tal conditions: suppliers always had an outside
1091 option and full cost information. Accordingly, the
1092 diﬀerences in suppliers’ bargaining behavior across
1093 the diﬀerent experimental cells can be explained by
1094 their interaction with buyers. An ANOVA on the
1095 suppliers’ information exchange shows a main eﬀect
1096 for cost information (F(1, 100) = 6.92, p < 0.01):
1097 suppliers facing buyers with TCO information dis-
1098 closed more information than suppliers facing buy-
1099 ers with traditional information. We ﬁnd no eﬀect of
1100 the manipulations with respect to the buyers’ condi-
1101 tions on the suppliers’ integrative behavior, nor on
1102 the number of explicit requests for cooperation
1103 issued by suppliers. Furthermore, we observe that
1104 suppliers facing a powerful buyer used distributive
1105 behavior more frequently than suppliers in the other
1106 experimental conditions (F(1, 100) = 0.58, p < 0.10).
1107 More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that suppliers facing a
1108 powerful buyer with TCO information used more
1109 distributive threats and referred to their outside
1110 option more often than suppliers in the other exper-
1111 imental conditions. Suppliers’ negotiation behavior
1112 is also assessed by the composite measure problem
1113 solving approach (based on the post-bargaining
1114 questionnaires of the buyers). Main eﬀects are
1115 found for cost information (F(1, 100) = 4.83,
1116 p < 0.05) and power (F(1, 100) = 3.18, p < 0.10).
1117 Thus, compared to buyers with traditional cost
1118 information, buyers with TCO information
1119 reported that suppliers used more problem solving
1120 techniques and fewer distributive bargaining
1121 techniques. Furthermore, less powerful buyers felt
1122 that their opponent employed more problem
1123 solving techniques than buyers with an outside
1124 option. Overall, these results provide evidence that
1125 buyers’ behavior strongly aﬀects suppliers’
1126 behavior.
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1127 Discussion and conclusion
1128 In this paper, we examine the moderation eﬀect
1129 of cost information (TCO information versus tradi-
1130 tional cost information) on a buyer’s individual
1131 proﬁt at both high and low levels of buyer power.
1132 Our results indicate that the availability of detailed
1133 TCO information may alleviate the disadvantage
1134 that dependent buyers face vis-a `-vis a more power-
1135 ful supplier. This ﬁnding has important managerial
1136 implications. On the one hand, it implies that less
1137 powerful buyers can compensate for their power
1138 disadvantage by gathering more detailed cost infor-
1139 mation. On the other hand, powerful buyers do not
1140 seem to be able to use this more detailed cost infor-
1141 mation to enhance their power advantage in order
1142 to obtain even higher individual proﬁts.
1143 We explore the driver behind this result by exam-
1144 ining the negotiation process. Consistent with
1145 exchange theory and recent literature on informa-
1146 tion processing, we expect that buyers with detailed
1147 cost information and less power than their oppo-
1148 nent try to (re)gain control over their own outcomes
1149 by sharing information in an eﬀort to create integra-
1150 tive solutions. Because of their higher epistemic
1151 motivation, less powerful buyers have a greater
1152 incentive to engage in information acquisition and
1153 processing (e.g., Fiske, 1993; Van Kleef et al.,
1154 2006). Accordingly, we expect that less powerful
1155 buyers with TCO information seek a more integra-
1156 tive bargaining situation than powerful buyers,
1157 who are more prone to using distributive bargaining
1158 techniques because of their low epistemic motiva-
1159 tion (e.g., De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; Fiske,
1160 1993; Weingart et al., 1996).
1161 Support for these conjectures is found in our fol-
1162 low-up analyses, in which we examine whether the
1163 moderation eﬀect of TCO information on the rela-
1164 tion between power and individual proﬁt can be
1165 explained by the choice of negotiation strategy.
1166 Using Baron and Kenny’s (1986) framework for
1167 combining mediation and moderation, we ﬁnd that
1168 the moderation eﬀect of cost information on the
1169 relation between power and individual proﬁt is med-
1170 iated by buyers’ bargaining behavior. Analysis of
1171 the buyers’ communications suggests that buyers
1172 with TCO information disclose more information
1173 than buyers with traditional cost information. Con-
1174 sistent with prior research (e.g., Perdue & Summer,
1175 1991), we ﬁnd that more powerful buyers disclose
1176 less information and use more distributive bargain-
1177 ing techniques than less powerful buyers. The
1178 results also reveal an unexpected positive eﬀect of
1179 TCO information on distributive behavior. How-
1180 ever, this eﬀect can be explained by the ﬁnding that
1181 buyers with TCO information and power tend to
1182 use distributive techniques. Furthermore, a limited
1183 analysis of suppliers’ bargaining behavior revealed
1184 its reciprocal nature. Suppliers facing buyers with
1185 TCO information disclosed more information than
1186 suppliers facing buyers with traditional information.
1187 It also emerged that suppliers facing powerful buy-
1188 ers with TCO information used more distributive
1189 bargaining techniques than suppliers in the other
1190 experimental conditions. As the experimental
1191 manipulation for the suppliers is the same in each
1192 of the experimental conditions, the diﬀerences in
1193 suppliers’ bargaining behavior across the diﬀerent
1194 experimental cells can only be explained by their
1195 interaction with the buyers. These ﬁndings provide
1196 support for our conjecture that less powerful buyers
1197 are able to create a cooperative relationship, into
1198 which the supplier is willing to enter. This resulted
1199 not only in higher individual proﬁts, but also in
1200 higher joint proﬁts.
1201 From these results, we conclude that the manip-
1202 ulation of power and cost information resulted in
1203 buyers using diﬀerent negotiation techniques. Less
1204 powerful buyers who have access to TCO data are
1205 more likely to resort to problem solving techniques,
1206 whereas powerful buyers tend to rely on distributive
1207 bargaining techniques. Particularly interesting is
1208 that the problem solving strategy adopted by less
1209 powerful buyers with TCO information seems to
1210 be eﬀective, whereas the distributive bargaining
1211 strategy adopted by more powerful buyers with
1212 TCO results in less information sharing and in less
1213 eﬀective negotiation outcomes. Less powerful buy-
1214 ers seem to be motivated to create a cooperative
1215 and coordinated relationship, in which the supplier
1216 is willing to consider the buyer’s objectives. When
1217 a buyer shares information about needs and prefer-
1218 ences and/or makes concessions that facilitate the
1219 development of a solution, the supplier is likely to
1220 reciprocate (e.g., Campbell et al., 1998; Dekker,
1221 2004). This may explain the higher individual proﬁts
1222 for less powerful buyers with TCO information.
1223 Less powerful buyers lacking TCO information
1224 are less able or willing to communicate the right
1225 information and therefore to create integrative situ-
1226 ations. More powerful buyers, on the other hand,
1227 believe to have power and choose a distributive bar-
1228 gaining strategy that, in a tit-for-tat move, the sup-
1229 plier responds to by also resorting to a distributive
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1230 bargaining strategy. Thus, a powerful buyer’s dis-
1231 tributive bargaining strategy may not be eﬀective
1232 when he is facing an equally powerful supplier.
1233 Overall, our results suggest that powerful buyers
1234 with reﬁned TCO information may not maximize
1235 possible beneﬁts from buyer–supplier interactions
1236 due to their bargaining strategy. Their (false) feeling
1237 of power causes an increase in distributive bargain-
1238 ing techniques and a reluctance to share the infor-
1239 mation necessary for interﬁrm cost minimization.
1240 This implies that powerful buyers may only beneﬁt
1241 from more reﬁned accounting information systems
1242 if these ﬁrms undertake eﬀorts that encourage infor-
1243 mation sharing and discourage distributive bargain-
1244 ing strategies. Future research should examine
1245 whether, and under what conditions, interﬁrm con-
1246 trol systems and incentive systems may motivate
1247 buyers and suppliers to share cost information in
1248 such a way that supply chain performance is
1249 improved.
1250 We conclude with remarks on several limitations
1251 of this study and further directions for future
1252 research. First, while the experimental context
1253 induced by a simple negotiation game allows us to
1254 maintain control over exogenous variables, the
1255 scope for generalizing the results is somewhat lim-
1256 ited. Other factors, such as the incentive system,
1257 past negotiation history, and future negotiation
1258 probabilities, have been shown to impact negotiated
1259 outcomes but are not included in the present analy-
1260 sis. Future research is needed to determine the sen-
1261 sitivity of our results to several parameters excluded
1262 in the current study.
1263 Second, this study manipulates the experimental
1264 conditions of the buyers, but not the suppliers, that
1265 is, the suppliers’ experimental conditions were held
1266 constant. In particular, suppliers were always fully
1267 informed and powerful. As a consequence, our con-
1268 clusions do not generalize beyond negotiation set-
1269 tings in which the supplier is always at least as
1270 powerful as the buyer. Further research can modify
1271 these experimental conditions and examine the role
1272 of TCO information from both buyer and supplier
1273 perspectives.
1274 Third, although optimal joint outcomes are
1275 introduced, our study focuses primarily on buyer
1276 outcomes. This focus underplays the cost/beneﬁt
1277 trade-oﬀ of obtaining the additional information
1278 needed for TCO. Since TCO information is not
1279 costless, it would be interesting to consider whether
1280 buyers would be willing to incur the cost of obtain-
1281 ing TCO information if it is eﬃcient to do so.
1282 Fourth, our manipulation of TCO information is
1283 obviously a simpliﬁcation of reality, providing
1284 many avenues for further research. In this paper,
1285 we take a deterministic approach to TCO informa-
1286 tion, which allows us to study the impact of cost
1287 information on negotiation behavior and outcomes.
1288 Our aim was not to describe a value chain and ABC
1289 analysis, nor to discuss data collection mechanisms
1290 and challenges. Neither did we seek to identify
1291 and categorize important TCO cost drivers. How-
1292 ever, more research is needed on these issues to
1293 eﬀectively identify critical cost drivers for estimating
1294 TCO. Future research may consider aspects such as
1295 the manner in which buyers collect TCO data (e.g.,
1296 from the supplier, benchmarking, past experience),
1297 the type of TCO systems implemented (e.g., formal
1298 vs. informal, standardized vs. unique models), and
1299 how these design aspects impact buyer–supplier
1300 relations and negotiations. In addition, examining
1301 the eﬀects of imperfect TCO information would also
1302 be interesting. In this study, perfect TCO informa-
1303 tion was provided to decision-makers. In reality,
1304 TCO information is characterized by mistakes and
1305 simpliﬁcations, which may have important implica-
1306 tions on the negotiation process and its outcomes.
1307 Similarly, it would be interesting to consider how
1308 costs that are diﬃcult to measure (e.g., opportunity
1309 costs of reduced sales, productivity losses due to
1310 downtime) can be included in TCO systems.
1311 Because of the diﬃculty of measuring these costs
1312 reliably, they are typically not recorded in a buyer’s
1313 accounting system. However, they may represent a
1314 substantial cost in total costs. An investigation of
1315 how the negotiation process and outcomes are
1316 aﬀected when less objective or less reliable cost esti-
1317 mates are explicitly included in the TCO system
1318 would add useful insights to the literature. Finally,
1319 further research could consider whether audited
1320 TCO information (either by a third party or by
1321 the partner) would be considered more reliable than
1322 unaudited TCO information, and if so, what the
1323 implications for the buyer–supplier relation would
1324 be.
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Low power (no outside option) Equal power (outside option)
Cost information
TCO information Cell 1 (n = 30) Cell 2 (n = 26)
Traditional cost information Cell 3 (n = 26) Cell 4 (n = 22)
Price (=income) Maintenance Spare parts
Cost table for the supplier (in cell 1, 2, 3 and 4)
a
Contract 1 600 Contract A* 1350 Contract R 2250
Contract 2 1200 Contract B 1200 Contract S 2000
Contract 3 1800 Contract C 1050 Contract T 1750
Contract 4 2400 Contract D 900 Contract U 1500
Contract 5* 3000 Contract E 750 Contract V 1250
Contract 6 3600 Contract F 600 Contract W 1000
Contract 7 4200 Contract G 450 Contract X 750
Contract 8 4800 Contract H 300 Contract Y 500
Contract 9 5400 Contract I 150 Contract Z* 250
a The tables were constructed such that the minimum (3000 Euro) and maximum proﬁts (5000 Euro) that buyers and suppliers could
earn were the same. Pareto-optimal joint outcomes correspond to the buyer and the supplier agreeing to contract 5AZ. This situation is
denoted with an asterisk (*).
Income = 6000
Price (=cost) Maintenance Spare parts
Cost table for the buyer with TCO information (in cell 1 and 2):
Contract 1 600 Contract A* 250 Contract R 150
Contract 2 1200 Contract B 500 Contract S 300
Contract 3 1800 Contract C 750 Contract T 450
Contract 4 2400 Contract D 1000 Contract U 600
Contract 5* 3000 Contract E 1250 Contract V 750
Contract 6 3600 Contract F 1500 Contract W 900
Contract 7 4200 Contract G 1750 Contract X 1050
Contract 8 4800 Contract H 2000 Contract Y 1200





Cost table for the buyer with traditional cost information (in cell 3 and 4):
Contract 1 600 Contract A* 1 Contract R 3
Contract 2 1200 Contract B 2 Contract S 6
Contract 3 1800 Contract C 3 Contract T 9
Contract 4 2400 Contract D 4 Contract U 12
(continued on next page)
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Contract 5* 3000 Contract E 5 Contract V 15
Contract 6 3600 Contract F 6 Contract W 18
Contract 7 4200 Contract G 7 Contract X 21
Contract 8 4800 Contract H 8 Contract Y 24
Contract 9 5400 Contract I 9 Contract Z* 27
a Number of maintenance sessions performed by the buyer each month.
b Spare parts procured by the buyer from a third party each month.
Appendix B. Measuring negotiation behavior




– Maintenance is more expensive for my company than spare parts
– Maintenance contracts start at €250 (=contract A) and increase by €250 until €2250 (=contract I); con-
tracts for spare parts start at €150 (= contract R) and increase by €150 until €1350 (=contract Z)
Rewards – I am pleased with the concessions made thus far
Positive normative
appeals
– Your oﬀers have been fair and equitable
Request for
cooperation
– Let us cooperate
General threats – Make a concession or you will be in trouble
Exit threats – Respond with a concession or I will call another supplier
Punishment – This negotiation is going nowhere
Warnings – My company has a policy against uncooperative suppliers
Positional
commitment
– I refuse to concede any further
– I refuse to drop my price below the present level
B.2. Buyers’ problem solving approach
Observed ratings from suppliers’ questionnaires (items were reverse coded)
Do you feel that the person with whom you were paired was more interested in
solving your mutual problem, or more self-interested?
1 2345
Solving a mutual problem Self-interested
Rate your partner’s bargaining strategies
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Appendix C. Bivariate correlation matrix (n = 104)
1234567 89 1 0
1 Buyer’s individual proﬁt
a 1
2 Supplier’s individual proﬁt
b 0.71 (**)1
3 Joint proﬁt
c 0.54 (**) 0.21 (*)1
4 Information exchange
d 0.14 0.19 0.41 (**)1
5 Integrative behavior
e 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.02 1
6 Requests for cooperation
f 0.15 0.05 0.27 (**) 0.30 (**) 0.36 (**)1
7 Distributive behavior
g 0.22 (*) 0.20 (*) 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.11 1
8 Problem solving approach
h 0.41 (**) 0.10 0.44 (**) 0.35 (**) 0.16 0.38 (**) 0.09 1
9 Cost information
i 0.55 (**) 0.34 (**) 0.36 (**) 0.23 (*) 0.13 0.23 (**) 0.23 (*) 0.82 (**)1
10 Power
j 0.27 (**) 0.35 (**) 0.04 0.20 (*) 0.21 (*) 0.25 (**) 0.35 (**) 0.23 (*) 0.00 1
(*) Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
(**) Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
a Buyer’s individual proﬁt at the end of the game (based on the cost table provided in Appendix A).
b Supplier’s individual proﬁt at the end of the game (based on the cost table provided in Appendix A).
c Joint proﬁt is the sum of buyer’s individual proﬁt and supplier’s individual proﬁt at the end of the game.
d Information exchange is coded ‘‘0” for participants not revealing any information about their cost structure, ‘‘1” for participants revealing the relative importance (but not the
numerical values) of each of the three issues under negotiation, and ‘‘2” for participants revealing the relative importance and the numerical values of each of the three issues under
negotiation.
e Coded from the messages sent by buyers (based on the behavioral coding scheme in Appendix B1). Summated scale determined by adding up two integrative behavior types
(rewards and positive normative appeals) and solving for the mean value. Cronbach’s alpha = 0.70.
f Coded from the messages sent by buyers (based on the behavioral coding scheme in Appendix B1). Single scale item (requests for cooperation).
g Coded from the messages sent by buyers (based on the behavioral coding scheme in Appendix B1). Summated scale determined by adding ﬁve distributive behavior types (general
threats, exit threats, positional commitment, punishments, warnings) together and solving for the mean value. Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81.
h Buyer’s problem solving approach based on observed ratings from supplier’s questionnaire. Summated scale determined by adding the four post-bargaining questionnaire items
included in Appendix B2 together and solving for the mean value. Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88.
i Dummy variable, experimental manipulation: 0 for traditional cost information, 1 for TCO information.
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